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Abstract 
In this article we use a discrete-time duration model to study the effect of unemployment 
compensation cm the re-employment probability in Spain. The data set used is composed of 
a sample of newly-unemployed men and women obtained from the first wave of the 
Household Panel of the European Union. Using three alternative measures for 
unemployment benefit receipt, we obtain that the predicted hazard rate among workers who 
do not receive benefits is double or higher than that for workers who receive benefits. The 
negative effect of benefit receipt on the re-employment probability is less significant for 
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positive duration dependence for women. 
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l. Introduction 
In their survey of the effect of unemployment compensation on labor 
market transitions, Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) concluded that 
" ... the findings are far from robust." We take this as an invitation 
to do further work on the issue, to add new results to those of many 
studies which have found that benefit level or benefit duration have 
a negative, though moderate, impact on the re-employment probability.l 
A second motivation for this article is that, apart from the studies 
for the United Kingdom, research dealing with the effects of 
unemployment benefits on unemployment duration is much scarcer in 
Europe than in North America. 2 However, the importance of the 
generosity of the unemployment compensation system has been stressed 
for European countries, where rising unemployment appears to be chiefly 
caused by longer duration of unemployment (Bean (1994) and Alogoskoufis 
et al. (1995)). Despite scant evidence on the desincentive effect of 
unemployment benefits in Europe, a number of countries have recently 
carried out reforms of their unemployment compensation systems, aimed 
at tightening eligibili ty rules and curtailing benefi ts. For instance, 
Spain in 1992, where the reform was partly based on budgetary reasons. 
Research on the effects of unemployment compensation in Spain has 
met with deficient data. A survey --Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida y 
Trabajo (ECVT) -- carried out by the Ministry of Economics and Finance 
in 1985, containing retrospective questions, allowed to reconstruct 
employment history with imputed benefit entitlement for a large sample 
of workers. Using this data set Alba-Ramírez and Freeman (1990) 
1 The literature is particularly extensive for the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) provide a 
survey. 
2 Appropriate data are harder to come by in Continental Europe. 
For instance, the comparatively larger number of studies for Germany 
have been favored by availabili ty of the Socioeconomic Panel. See Hunt 
(1995) and references therein. 
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provided some primary results for Spain¡ in particular, that 
unemployment insurance eligibility was associated with longer duration 
of unemployment. Other Studies, using the same data set, have obtained 
similar results (Andrés and García (1993), Ahn and Ugidos (1995), and 
Blanco (1995)) . A different approach was taken by Cebrián et al. (1995) 
by using data on registered unemployed people who received benefits. 
They found that longer benefit entitlement tends to delay exit from 
unemployment, and that the replacement rate has little or no effect on 
the re-employment probability. 
Matched files from the Active Population Survey (EPA), recently 
made available, have permitted longitudinal analysis of labor market 
transitions. The EPA's panel structure allows to follow unemployed 
workers for a maximum o six quarters. This data set, used by Bover et 
al. (1997) and Alba-Ramírez (1997b) for example, exhibits three main 
limitations for studying the effect of unemployment compensation on the 
re-employment probability: (1) It only provides information on whether 
or not workers currently receive unemployment benefits. Each quarter 
in the sample, unemployed workers are asked to indicate their situation 
with respect to the employment office: registered receiving benefits, 
registered wi thout benefits, and not registered. (2) Because labor 
force status and other time-variant variables are provided quarterly, 
many short employment and unemployment spells are likely to be missed. 
This is important for Spain, where labor turnover has increased as a 
result of fixed-term contracts (see below). (3) For reasons that are 
not clear, the answers to the question of benefit status are found to 
be quite inconsistent over time when EPA matched files are used to 
follow workers' unemployment spells. This makes it hard to obtain clean 
results on the relationship between the re-employment probability and 
receipt of unemployment benefits. To deal with the problem, Bover et 
al. (1997) assumed that benefits are received throughout, up to the 
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last time the individual declares to be receiving them. Based on this, 
and using a discrete-time duration model, they obtain a strong 
coefficient for the dummy "receipt of unemployrnent benefits".3 
In this paper, we use a newly-released data set, the Household 
Panel of the European Union (HPEU). Unlike the EPA, the HPEU provides 
monthly labor market status, and distinguishes between receipt of 
insurance benefits and receipt of assistance benefits. In addition, 
workers are asked to indicate the monthly average amount of benefit 
received. Using the first wave of the HPEU, we obtained a sample of men 
and women who experienced unemployrnent at sorne point during 1993, and 
study the effect of these various measures of unemployrnent compensation 
on the re-employment probability. Given the discrete nature of the 
data, we apply a discrete-time duration model (Allison (1982)) . We find 
that receipt of unemployment compensation significantly reduces the re­
employment probability. Such effect is found to be stronger for men 
than for women. For a reference man who receives unemployment benefits, 
the predicted hazard rate in a given month is almost three times as 
high as that for a reference man who do not receive benefits. This 
3 Bover et al. (1997) claim that the inconsistencies in 
unemployment benefit status along the unemployrnent spell are due to 
measurement error arising from administrative delay in payrnent of 
benefits. Accepting this, one can adjust the raw data by assuming that 
workers who do not receive benefits in the beginning of their 
unemployment spell and report to be doing so later are indeed 
recipients from the moment they became unemployed. However, this 
adjustment does not account for those unemployed workers who were 
affected by the delay (were unemployed and eligible for unemployment 
compensation but did not receive benefits in the first quarter(s) of 
their unemployrnent spell) , and exited unemployrnent before benefits were 
ever received. Moreover, an attentive examination of the matched files 
reveales that changes in benefit status do not follow a consistent 
pattern. For example, the flow of individuals who change from not 
recipients to recipients continues beyond the second quarter of the 
unemployment spell, which casts doubts over belated receipt of benefi ts 
due to administrative reasons. At any rate, the type of assumption made 
by Bover et al. (1997) is likely to cause upward bias on the negative 
effect of benefit receipt on the re-employrnent probability, simply 
because the adjustment is made only for those who remain unemployed. 
See Alba-Ramírez (1997b) for a detailed analysis of EPA matched files 
and shortcomings of the variable "unemployment benefit receipt". 
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differential remains quite constant along unemployment duration¡ and 
the probability of leaving unemployment increases moderately as the 
unemployment spell lengthens. 
The negative effect of unemployment compensation on the re­
employment probability can be interpreted in the light of the standard 
job search model, which predicts a higher reservation wage among 
workers eligible for unemployment benefits. Moreover, in the Spanish 
economy where fixed-term contracts are pervasive, a higher hazard among 
non recipients of benefits can be favored by on-the-job search. As 
temporary workers are les s likely to qualify for unemployment 
compensation than workers separated from permanent jobs, and the end 
of a fixed-term contract can be anticipated, liquidity constraints (or 
a higher opportunity cost of unemployment) can foster on-the-job search 
among temporary workers. 
The remaining part of the article is organized as follows. In the 
next section we provide basic notions concerning the Spanish 
unemployment compensation system¡ in section 111 we present an 
empirical model for studying the re-employment probability¡ in section 
IV we refer to the data, indicate the criteria for sample selection, 
and show descriptive statistics¡ in section V we present the 
specifications, discuss the results, and give some interpretations. 
Finally, the last section contains a summary and the conclusion. 
11. Unemployment Compensation System in Spain 
In this section we describe the unemployment compensation system as it 
stood in 1993, which is the reference year for the data set on 
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unemployment duration used in this article. 4 As in other European 
countries, t.he Spanish unemployment compensation system is composed of 
two parts: the insurance (or contributory) system and the assistance 
(or non contributory) system. The first is financed with a payroll tax 
of about 7 percent of which approximately 80 percent is charged on the 
employer and 20 percent on the employee¡ and it is not experienced 
rated. The assistance system is financed through transfers from the 
public budget. Eligible for insurance are workers whose unemployment 
situation is recognized according to law by the labor authority¡ i.e. 
the job was 10st involuntarily, including end of a fixed-term contract. 
Eligibility requires Social Security contributions for a minimum of 
twelve months during the six years preceding unemp1oyment . Workers who 
made contri.butions for 12 -17 months are eligible for 4 months of 
benefits, a contribution of 18-23 months entails 6 month of benefits, 
and so on to a maximum of 24 months of benefits for those who 
contributed to Social Security for 72 months or longer (see Table Al) . 
The amount of contributory benefit is determined as a percentage 
of the average wage in the twelve months preceding unemployment. 5 It 
is 70 percent during the first six months of unemp1oyment, and 60 
percent the remaining period of eligibility. The minimum amount of 
contributory benefits is 75 percent of the minimum wage if the worker 
has no dependent children and 100 percent if he or she has dependent 
children. There is also a cap on benefit set at 170 percent of the 
minimum wage, which is raised to 195 percent if the unemployed person 
has a dependent child, and 220 if he or she has two or more dependent 
4 As indicated earlier, the Spanish compensation system was 
reformed in 1992 in order to increase entitlement requirements and to 
reduce benefit amounts. The previous change took place in 1984, and a 
small change on the assistance system in 1989. 
5 For both, calculating the tax base and to determine the benefit 
amount, workers are banded in contribution brackets according to twelve 
professional categories. 
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children. 
On the other hand, the assistance benefits are granted to 
unemployed persons whose total income does not exceed the minumum wage 
and are in one of the following situations: (1) exhausted contributory 
benefits and have family dependents, (2) aged 45 years or older and 
received contributory benefits for at least 12 months, (3) did not meet 
the minimum contribution period for eligibility, (4) returned from 
foreign migration, (5) was released from prison, (6) an invalidity 
spell ended by the labor authority declaring the worker able to take 
a job, (7) aged 52 or older. 6 The amount of assistance is 75 percent 
of the minimum wage, except for workers aged 45 or older who received 
contributory benefits for 24 months. Their benefits vary with the 
number of family dependents: 75 percent of the minimum wage if one or 
no family dependents, 100 percent if two family dependents, and 125 
percent if three or more family dependents. Duration of benefits is 
conditioned on in which of the aboye indicated situations the worker 
is, on being 45 or older, and on having or not family dependents (see 
Table Al and Toharia (1994)). Only since 1994, contributory and 
assistance benefits are subject to the income tax, and sorne Social 
Security contributions are deducted from benefits. Family dependents 
can be the spouse, children, and siblings up to the second degree. 
Their existence is relevant for benefit entitlement when total hosehold 
income devided by the number of members in the household does not 
exceed the minumum wage. 
6 Also, special assistant benefi ts are available to workers of the 
agricultural sector who have residence in the autonomous communities 
of Andalucía and Extremadura. 
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111. An Empirical Model for the Re-Employ,ment Probability 
l. Theoretical considerations 
In a simple version of the standard job search model (Lippman and 
Maceall (1976)) with a constant reservation wage, the re-employment 
, 
probability is the result of two probabilities, the rate at which 
offers arrive (which depends on the search intensity) times the 
probability that a random offer is accepted (based on the reservation 
wage rule). In this theoretical framework, the effect of unemployment 
compensation on the re-employment probability can be assessed from two 
points of view. First, the unemployment compensation system provides 
workers wi th an insurance against their future unemployment i and 
second, unemployment benefits are granted as a subsidy to support 
unemployed persons while looking for a job. According to the insurance 
dimension, unemployment compensation can increase the re-employment 
probability because workers are more willing to accept jobs with higher 
risk of layoff. From the subsidy point of view, unemployment 
compensation can reduce the re-employment probabili ty, because a lower 
cost of being unemployed entails a lower intensity of search. However, 
availability of unemployment benefits provides resources that can be 
used to improve the job-search technology. In principle, the net effect 
is indeterminate and, thus, it becomes an empirical question. In this 
respect, many studies find that the desintentive effect dominates for 
the level and duration of unemployment benefits appear to be associated 
with longer duration of unemployment. 
In this investigation we want to highlight a feature of the 
Spanish labor market that can be relevant in the relationship between 
unemployment compensation and the re-employment probability. It is the 
duality between indefinite and fixed-term contracts, given that a one­
third of wage and salary workers held the latter type of employment in 
1993. Because the indefinite contract entails high dismissal costs, 
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firms predominantly use fixed-term contracts to hire new employeesi 
which implies that most employment offers received by job seekers are 
for temporary jobs. Workers know that accepting a fixed-term contract 
hastens their future unemployment, except for the fact that the fixed­
term contract can be renewed. However, very few of workers holding 
fixed-term contracts are likely to become permanent employees (Alba-
Ramírez (1997a)). 
Because of the high risk of experiencing unemployment associated 
wi th accepting a fixed-term contract, workers have an incentive to wai t 
for an indefinite-contract offer to arrive. If the worker considers 
that this is very unlikely to occur, waiting will still be worth it to 
maximize the duration of the subsequent employment spell. However, the 
worker is in a better position to wait for a "better" offer if 
unemployment compensation is received. In this context, one can think 
of two types of unemployed workers: (1) those whose fixed-term contract 
ended, and (2) those who were laid-off from a permanent jobo The latter 
are likely to be eligible for unemployment compensation for the maximum 
duration and, in their quest for another permanent job, are in a better 
position to search for long time. The former, by the contrary, having 
lost a short-duration job, are likely to return to work as soon as 
possible in order to accumulate tenure that provides for unemployment 
insurance entitlement. 7 Given the high proportion of wage and salary 
workers who hold fixed-term contracts in Spain, labor turnover is high. 
The higher the job turnover the shorter the employment spells and more 
need to return to work to assure availabili ty of unemployment benefi ts 
in the future. By moving quickly from job to job (Le. searching while 
employed), fixed-term contract holders can approach the maximum 
7 The maximum potential duration of unemployment insurance (24 
months) can be yielded by a tenure of 6 years in the job prior to 
unemployment. These 6 years form the maximum period in which 
eligibility can be built by those who hold short-term jobs. 
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duration of eligibility for unemployment insurance and thus be more 
protected against the costs of unemployment. 8 
One can think of a linkage between building eligibility for 
unemployment compensation and labor turnover. Because sorne individuals 
are more prone to change jobs frequently, a measure for each worker' s 
previous employment experience can be important in explaining the re­
employment probability. At first, it is unclear how controlling for 
this will affect the estimated impact of unemployment compensation on 
the probability of leaving unemployment. In part this is so because of 
the way entitlement to unemployment compensation can be generated. 9 
2. A Discrete-Time Duration Model 
In this section we describe a discrete-time hazard model that fits the 
nature of the data used. An individual' s unemployment spell is 
represented by a random variable, T, which can take on positive integer 
values only. We observe a total of n independent individuals (i = 1, 
... ,n) beginning a sorne natural starting point t = 1. In the data used 
in the paper, such point is the month when the worker becomes 
unemployed. Each observation continues until time t, at which point an 
event occurs - -the unemployment spell ends as the worker becomes 
8 This implies that temporary workers are more likely to search 
on the job than permanent employees. For example, in the Labor Force 
Survey (EPA) of the second quarter of 1993, 5.17 percent of people wi th 
a fixed-term contract were looking for another job, compared with 0.65 
percent of persons who had a indefinite employment relationship. Of 
course, the former figure is likely to be much higher for workers 
approaching the end of their contracts. See Pissarides & Wadsworth 
(1994) for U.K. evidence regarding on-the-job search. 
9 Consider, for example, a worker whose 6 months contract is about 
to finish and has not accumulated elegibility from previous employment. 
If the cont:ract ends without an alternative job, the worker can apply 
for assistance benefits that can be granted for 6 months if he does not 
have family dependents or 21 months if he has family dependents. On the 
other hand, the worker can accept whatever job is available in order 
to accumulate employment tenure to become eligible for unemployment 
insurance. This latter option can be taken as a way to assure a less 
liquidity-constrained job search in the future. 
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employed, T = t-- or the observation is censored. The observation is 
censored when the surviving individual is observed at month t but not 
at month t+1. Spells ending in exit from the labor force are also taken 
as censored. It is assumed that the time of censoring is independent 
of the hazard rate for the occurrence of events, at least after 
controlling for other factors. 
For modelling the transi tion from unemployment to employment, we 
define the discrete hazard rateo For the i-th person the hazard rate 
to employment in interval t, hi(t i ), is the conditional probability of 
becoming employed in this interval, given that individual i has been 
unemployed until t. 
where Xi(t i ) is a vector of covariates for individual i, sorne of which 
can be time-variant. On the other hand, the conditional probability 
that individual i remains unemployed in period t is given by 
And not conditioning on the individual' s previous unemployment history, 
the survivor function up to period t is 
(3 ) PI [Ti> ti I.] =3 ( ti I.)=rr t (1-h i ('t i I.) ) 
T=l 
where T indicates the longest observed duration. For individual i, the 
la 
transition to employment can be expressed in terms of the respective 
hazard rate and the survivor function as 
t-l 
(4) pr[Ti =ti l.]=hi (t i l.)I1 (l-h i (tl.)) 
~=l 
To derive the likelihood function for this model, we need to define the 
indicator function 
Ói = 1, if individual i makes a transition to employment 
o, otherwise 
Assuming independence of all observations, the sample likelihood 
function is given by 
n 
(5) L = I1 [pr(Ti =t i l.)]6 i [pr(Ti >t i l·)]1-6 i • 
i=l 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (5), we can write the likelihood function 
in terms of the hazard rate, 
(6) L 
We now just need to specify the hazard rate and plug its expression 
into the likelihood function in order to estimate the coefficients. For 
the hazard rate we chose the logistic specification. lO For individual 
i, the hazard rate to employment in period t is given by 
1(7 ) 
10 In this specification the hazard rates need not be 
proportional, making it unnecessary to assume that absolute differences 
in covariates imply proportionate differences in hazard rates (the 
covariates act multiplicatively on the hazard function). See 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) p. 32. 
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where a(t i ) is a vector of dummy variables for each period (month) 
workers remain unemployed, Zi (ti) is a vector of explanatory variables 
which may vary wi th time, {3 is the vector of parameters to be 
known as the baseline hazard, describes in a flexible way the time 
dependency of the transition process. We specify it by monthly dummies. 
The discrete hazard model described in this section can be 
understood as a sequence of binomial-choice equations defined on the 
surviving population at each time l1 (months in our data) . Furthermore, 
it can be shown that the likelihood function for the discrete hazard 
model as expressed by equation (6) is equivalent to that of a logit 
model where all individual observations (monthly spells, or months at 
risk of making a transition to employrnent) are pooled (Allison 1982) . 
To see this, we can take logarithm in (6) to obtain the log-likelihood 
function, 
(8) log L 
If we define a dummy variable Yi(t i ) equal to 1 if person i makes a 
transition to employment at time ti and zero otherwise, equation (9) 
can be witten as 
(9) log L 
11 See Allison (1982), Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), and 
Jenkins (1995). 
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A further manipulation of (9) pemits to write the log-likelihood 
function as 
(9) log L 
n tL L [Yi (,;) laghi (,; l·) + (l-Yi (,;) ) lag (l-h i (,; l·) )] 
i=l ~=l 
where the two sources of contribution to the likelihood function can 
be distinguished: the first term is the contribution of persons who 
exi t to employment and the second term is the contribution of persons 
who remain l~nemployed when she was last observed. Accepting the model 
specification given by (7), the estimates for a and ~ posses the 
standard properties of the maximum likelihood estimations. 
IV. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
l. Sample Selection 
The data used in this article are obtained from the Household Panel of 
the European Union (HPEU). Only the first wave, carried out in 1994, 
has so far been provided by the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE). 
A nation-wide representative sample of 7,206 households constitutes the 
first wave. To select the sample used in this paper we consider the 
following question: "Was there any change in your main activity during 
1993?" The possible answers are "yes 11 and lino". We retain workers aged 
16-64 who said yes because they are subsequently asked to indicate 
their main activity (labor force status) in each month of 1993. Then 
we select those workers who were employed in January and unemployed in 
February, or employed in February and unemployed in March, or employed 
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in March and unemployed in April. 12 
As we know the workers' labor force status in every month of 
1993, it is possible to follow each individual until he or she makes 
a transition to employment or to inactivity. We consider only the first 
transition out of unemployment, that is, we do not study multiple 
spells. By selecting the sample the indicated way, we obtain a lIflow 
sample" of unemployed workers in the terminology of Lancaster (1990), 
p. 162. To give each cohort of unemployed persons the same maximum time 
span to measure labor market transitions, we follow the first cohort 
until October, the second cohort until November, and the third cohort 
until December. Therefore, spells of unemployed workers who have not 
made a transition by the ninth month of unemployment are censored --the 
censoring is imposed for the first and second cohorts regardless of 
what happens in the remaining observed period. The resul ting sample is 
composed of 239 individuals (33.5 percent of women), which generate 
1,426 monthly spells of unemployment. 
In order to elicit information on unemployment compensation, the 
HPEU asks workers about receipt of unemployment benefits during 1993. 
Those who respond "yes 11 are subsequently asked about the type of 
benefits (contributory or assistance), and the number of months of 
receipt together with the average monthly amount for each type of 
compensation. 13 This retrospective information is used to reconstruct 
the benefit history of each unemployed worker during his or her 1993 
. 12 From workers employed in March and unemployed in April we 
excluded those who were employed in January and unemployed in February 
to avoid repeated spells in the sample. Because 1993 was a recession 
year in the Spanish economy, the flow out of employment was 
particularly high. 
13 There is also information about other types of benefits 
received by the worker during 1993 i but they are not clearly linked to 
the period of unemployment. However, there is not information about 
redundancy payments. 
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unemployment spell. For the workers who experienced unemployment more 
than once in 1993, we adopted the rule that benefit receipt took place 
during the first spell of unemployment following the month in which 
they are observed employed. This spell is the one we consider for the 
analysis in this article. 14 At the start of the unemployment spell, 
66 percent of the sample received unemployment compensation (44 percent 
insurance and 22 percent assistance). Based on the available 
information, we observed only 6 individuals who exhausted unemployment 
insurance and subsequently received unemployment assistance. 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table A2 presents sample means and proportions for individual 
observations and for monthly spells. At the beginning of the 
unemployment spell 65.4 of men and 67.5 of women received unemployment 
compensation. The proportion of insurance recipients was higher among 
men than women, which translates into a lower benefit amount for the 
latter. Table 1 and Graph 1 show the probability of remaining 
unemployed (survival rates) for the total sample, and also according 
to unemployment compensation status at the first month of the 
unemployed spell. For the total sample, 48.1 percent of individuals 
remained unemployed at the ninth month. This percentage varies by 
receipt of unemployment benefits: 60 percent for workers who received 
insurance benefit, 58.5 for assistance benefit recipients, and 25 
percent for workers who did not receive insurance nor assistance. 
Moreover, Graph 1 shows that for the first five months, the survival 
rate of assistance recipients is higher that for insurance recipients. 
14 In order to reduce the possible error associated wi th the 
indicated procedure, we tried sorne exceptions to the rule. For example, 
if the first spell was shorter than any of the others, and benefit 
duration was longer than the duration of the first spell, we considered 
that the workers did not receive benefits during the first (relevant) 
spell of unemployment. Because there were few cases and results were 
not affected, we simply applied the general rule. 
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However, after the fifth month, workers receiving assistance benefits 
leave unemployment at higher rates, closing the gap between the 
survival rates of recipients of each type of benefits. All in all, 
these figures provide the first indication of a positive relationship 
between unemployment compensation and the re-employment probability in 
Spain. 
A further look at the data can be carried out by obtaining the 
empirical hazard rates (Kaplan-Meier estimates) for the total sample, 
and according to benefit status at each month of the unemployment 
spell. Table 2 presents the results of this exercise. Numbers between 
parenthesis next to "exit" numbers refer to number of individuals 
leaving the labor force. Given that only 5 persons moved from 
unemployment to out of the labor force, we consider unnecessary to 
estimate a competing risks model, and take the corresponding durations 
as censored. Numbers in brackets next to "at risk" numbers in columns 
of benefit recipients indicate the number of workers who changed 
benefit status; the sign + means that they lost benefits and the sign ­
that they gained assistance benefits. In the column of non recipients 
we show the balance resulting from adding workers who lost benefits and 
subtracting those who started receiving assistance after loosing 
insurance benefits. 
Table 2 corroborates what has already been shown with the 
survival curves, namely, that workers receiving benefits exit 
unemployment at lower rate than non-recipients. Also, it is note worthy 
that the empirical hazard for the whole sample does not appear to 
exhibit duration dependence. Considering the total sample of men and 
women, the hazard rate is quite stable at around 9 percent, except for 
the low exit rate of the fourth month. For women, however, the 
empirical hazard tends to increase slightly as the unemployment spell 
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lengthens (results not shown). More on this below, when predicted 
hazards are calculated. 
v. Specification and Results 
1. Specification 
As explained earlier, to estimate the discrete-time hazard model 
described in section 111 we need to specify the hazard rate, which in 
this article is assumed to follow a logistic distribution. Then, as 
shown in the previous section, one can use an easy method to estimate 
the discrete-time hazard model, which consists of running a logit 
regression on the pooled set of monthly spells of unemployment 
experienced by the selected sample of 239 men and women. A clear 
advantage of this method is that estimates of the baseline hazard 
result directly from the estimation of the logit modelo Equation (7) 
can al so be written as 
where, as indicated earlier, hit is the hazard rate from unemployment 
to employment of individual i at time t¡ ~ is a vector of coefficients 
to be esti.mated¡ and CI. (t), the baseline hazard, is a vector of 
coefficients for monthly dummies, one for each month workers are at 
"risk" of becoming employed. This model assumes that there is not 
unobserved heterogenei ty in the sample of unemployed workers we use. 15 
15 When the hazard rate is nonparametric, as in the continuous­
time Cox model or as in the discrete-time model exposed in this 
article, ,rarious studies have shown that including unobserved 
heterogeneity does not affect the estimated coefficients much (Meyer 
(1990)) . 
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In the vector of covariates we include the following groups of 
variables: 
(i) Demographic characteristics. Gender for estimations using the whole 
sample, marital status, age groups, and levels of education. 
(ii) The individual's labor market history. In principIe, according to 
discussion in section 111, the worker's previous employment history 
(i.e. job turnover) should be an important explanatory factor of the 
re-employment probability in Spain. The HPEU allows to obtain sorne 
indicators of job turnover. Workers are asked to indicate if they have 
been unemployed in the last five yearSj and, if the answer is "yes", 
they are subsequently asked to report the number of times they suffered 
unemployment during that period of time, as well as if any of those 
unemployment spells lasted 12 or more months. Moreover, workers are 
asked whether or not they experienced unemployment for at least a month 
before taking the first job. AII this information can be used to create 
dummies referred to the worker's previous unemployment experience. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the type of job held by the worker before 
becoming unemployed. 
(iii) Household and local labor market conditions. Two variables are 
used to control for this: the number of children aged less than 3, and 
the unemployment rate in each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities 
in the country. 
(iv) Dummies for the month of entering unemployrnent. Given that the 
sample that we use is composed of persons who entered unemployment in 
February (sample 1), March (sample 2), and May (sample 3) of 1993, we 
control for this with the corresponding dummies in the regression. 
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(v) Seasona.I dummies. To include calendar time in the regression, we 
define the following three dummies that are egual to one for the months 
in which the unemployment spell is observed, and zero otherwise: 
18pring" (Februrary, March, or May) ¡ 18ummer" (June, July, or August) ¡ 
and 11Autumn11 (8eptember, October, or Decembér) . 
(vi) Unemployrnent compensation. There are three alternative ways for 
us to specify the relationship between unemployment compensation and 
the re-employment probability. First, we use a dummy equals 1 at each 
month the worker received unemployment insurance or unemployment 
assistance during his unemployment spell ¡ 16 and zero otherwise. 
8econd, given that we can distinguish between contributory and 
assistance compensation, we use two dummies that equal to 1 at each 
month of the unemployment spell the worker received unemployment 
insurance or unemployment assistance, respectively¡ and zero otherwise. 
Finally, we include in the regression the monthly average amount of 
benefits received by the worker during the time of the unemployment 
spell she was receiving benefits from either type of unemployment 
compensation¡ and zero otherwise. Although this variable is constant 
during the period the worker is receiving benefits17 , being receiving 
it or not is time-dependent, as the other two variables just described. 
2. Estimation results 
As explained, in this article we use three alternative procedures for 
investigating the relationship between unemployment compensation and 
the re-employment probability, which are different one another in the 
16 Notice that an unemployed worker can be elegible for 
unemployment compensation and he may choose not to claim it. One reason 
for this behavior could be that he has good employment prospects and 
wants to preserve entitlement for the future. 
17 Unfortunately we do not know the wage prior to unemployment 
and, therefore, we cannot calculate the replacement ratio to use it 
instead of the unemployment income. 
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measure for benefit receipt used. The estimation results are presented 
for the whole sample, for men, and for women in Tables 3, 4 and S, 
respectively. Predicted hazard rates are contained in Table 6. In what 
follows, we first provide a general discussion of results associated 
with other regressors different from the unemployment compensation 
variable¡ second we describe and comment the findings related to the 
effect of unemployment compensation on the re-employment probability¡ 
third we gauge the magnitude of the effects by calculating the 
predicted hazard rates ¡ and fourth we give sorne interpretations of the 
results. 
General Results 
Ini tially, to study the relationship between unemployment compensation 
and the re-employment probability in Spain, we make an effort to take 
into account the workers' unemployment history. This is advisable 
because individuals more accustomed to move jobs are supposedly more 
"employable", and thus are expected to leave unemployment earlier. We 
can control for this by including among the regressors dummies intended 
to reflect the worker' s previous job turnover. The HPUE survey provides 
sorne information on the issue. There is the following question: "Did 
you experience unemployment in the last five years?1l If the answer is 
Ilyes ll the worker is further asked about the number of times he or she 
had been unemployed during the indicated period of time. However, given 
that the interviews took place in November and December of 1994, the 
information provided through these questions is contaminated by the 
fact that it includes job changes posterior to the worker's spell of 
unemployment we study. As those who became employed earlier had more 
time to change jobs, we may get a spurious correlation between job 
turnover and the re-employment probability. Indeed, we included a set 
of dummies obtained from the answers to the indicated question and 
found that the re-employment probability increases with job turnover. 
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This results was more apparent for men than for women (results not 
shown). Because of the indicated problems with this measure of job 
turnover, we do not use it in the main specification. However, we 
report the estimated results for the whole sample in Table A3 of the 
Appendix. 
An alternative measure for job turnover can be obtained from 
another question posed to workers who reported to have been unemployed 
at least once in the five-year period: 1B "Did any of those 
unemployment spells last for 12 months or longer?" About 40 percent 
responded "yes". By including the corresponding dummy, it obtained a 
negative and very significant coefficient (Table A4). However, we 
suspect that this variable is also affected by the same problem as the 
job turnover indicator, and we do not use it in the main specification. 
Finally, there are a third, less interesting variable which we retain 
in the main specification. It is based on the following question "Where 
you unemployed at least for a month before starting to work in your 
first j ob?" About 23 percent responded "yes". The corresponding dummy 
always obtained an insignificant coefficient. 
Results obtained by inclusion of other covariates in the 
estimated model are worth commenting. When there are children younger 
than 3 in the household, exit from unemployment is higher among men 
(Table 4), and lower among women (Table 5). Men who have completed 
secondary education appear to be more likely to become employed. As 
compared with middle-age women, women aged 16-29 leave unemployment 
lB All workers except 4 indicated to have been unemployed at least 
once in the previous five years. In principle, those 4 persons' answer 
is inconsistent because their labor force status changed in 1993 and 
this is the reason why they are in our sample. In the set of dummies 
for job turnover we created a separated dummy for this four persons, 
and interestingly obtained a positive and significant coefficient 
(Table A3) . 
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earlier¡ but, as the unemployment spell lengthens, their higher re­
employment probabili ty diminishes significantly. The negative duration 
dependence for younger women can be related to a reduced search 
intensity with unemployment duration if their time tends to be diverted 
to family commiments. 
;> To pick up local labor market condi tions, we also included in the 
/ regression the unemployment rate in 17 Autonomous Communities, which/ 
obtained a negative and significant coefficient for the whole sample 
only when the level of benefit is included in the regression. Such 
coefficient is zero for men¡ and negative and significant for women, 
regardless of the unemployment compensation variable used. The re­
employment probability is higher for women who lost their job in 
February, as compared to those who became unemployed in March or Apri l . 
And, also, women are more likely to leave unemployment in the autumn, 
rather than in the Spring or Summer. Notice, that failing to control 
for calendar time can generate positive duration dependence among 
women. 19 
As explained above, the discrete-time duration model estimated 
in this article has the advantage of providing a direct estimation of 
the baseline hazard rateo This is accomplished by including monthly 
dummies in the regression. Tables 3, 4, and 5 contain the coefficients 
obtained by those dummies for the whole sample, men, and women, 
respectively. The coefficients obtained for the monthly dummies 
indicate that, for workers with the omitted characteristics, the 
baseline hazard does not vary significantly as unemployment spells 
lengthen. Thus, in principIe the model does not exhibit significant 
19 We tried quarterly rate of growth of the GDP to take into 
account the effect of this macroeconomic variable, and found it 
insignificant, presumably due to its low variability. Measured as the 
variation over the same quarter of the previous year, GDP declined in 
each of the four quarters of 1993, at about one percent on average. 
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duration dependence. We need to assess duration dependence further by 
looking at the predicted hazard rates which, for a worker with given 
characteristics, depend on the coefficients for the monthly dummies as 
well as on coefficients for covariates interacted with log of 
unemployment duration. 
The Effect of Unemployment Compensation 
As shown in Table 3, the dummy equals to 1 for each month the worker 
indicated to be receiving contributory or assistance benefits obtains 
a negative and significant coefficient for the whole sample¡ as well 
as for men and women, separately. When the unemployment compensation 
variable is the amount of benefits received by the worker, it always 
obtains a negative and significant coefficient. By distinguishing 
between unemployment insurance (the contributory part of the 
unemployment compensation system) and unemployment assistance (the non 
contributory part) , both dummies obtain negative and significant 
coefficients. Notice, however, that the t-statistics associated with 
the unemployment compensation variables are much higher for men than 
for women. In the estimated equations, we included interaction terms 
between the unemployment compensation variables and log of unemployment 
duration without noticeable results. 20 
It is important to note that despite their significance, the 
inclusion of the job turnover variables does not affect much the 
estimated value of the coefficients for the unemployment compensation 
variables (see Tables A3 and A4). We realize that receipt of 
unemployment compensation itself is a good proxy for job turnover 
20 Sorne authors have investigated how the effect of unemployment 
compensation on the re-employment probability varies along the 
unemployment spell. For example, using a sample of male benefi t 
recipients for the United Kingdom, Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) 
found that the negative effect of unemployment income diminishes as 
unemployment spells lengthen. 
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because entitlement for benefits is based on employment history during 
the previous six years, except for the possibili ty that eligibili ty can 
be achieved by accumulating several employment spells. All in all, the 
three indicated measures for unemployment compensation point to the 
same result: That receipt of unemployment benefits is associated with 
lower exit rates from unemployment. 
Predicted Hazard Rates 
To provide an indication of the magnitude of unemployment compensation 
effect on the re-employment probability, we present in Table 6 the 
predicted hazard rates for a reference persono Hazards are,calculated 
according to each type of unemployment compensation variable used in 
the regressions (Tables 3, 4, and 5). The hazard for not recipients of 
benefits is that generated from the specification with a dummy for 
benefit receipt. For the whole sample, the reference person21 exits 
unemployment at a slightly increasing rate if she does not receive 
unemployment compensation. The average hazard rate for the first four 
months of the unemployment spell is 11.7 percent, and for the last four 
months is 17.5 percent. For the reference person who receives 
unemployment compensation, the hazard is much lower and is also 
slightly increasing, at 4.4 percent in the first four months and 7 
percent in the remaining duration of unemployment. If the level of 
benefit is used instead of the benefit receipt the hazard for the 
reference worker who receives benefits becomes moderately higher. 
Regarding the distinction between contributory and assistance 
benefits, the predicted hazards for the reference worker using the 
21 The reference person is aman (for the whole sample), married, 
aged 30-44 years, living in a household where there are no children 
younger than 3, possesses less than secondary education, experienced 
unemployed before obtaining the first job, became unemployed in April 
1993, the reference season is the summer, and lives in an autonomous 
community with an unemployment rate of 22 percent. 
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whole sample are virtually identical, in correspondence wi th the 
similarity between the coefficients for the respective dummies obtained 
(Table 3) .22 
Predicted hazards from estimates obtained by using separate 
samples for men and women are presented in the lower parts of Table 6. 
For men, using the dummy for receipt of unemployrnent compensation, the 
hazard rate among workers with the reference characteristics without 
benefits is three times (about twice if benefit level is used) as large 
as that for workers who receive benefits. This differential is quite 
constant along the unemployrnent spell, as is the hazard itself. By 
distinguishing receipt of insurance from receipt of assistance, we 
obtain that the latter produces a lower hazard. 
For the reference women without benefits the hazard rate is about 
twice that for the reference women who do not receive benefits. 
However, among women the time pattern of the hazard rate is more 
erratic. It is particularly high in the third and sixth months of 
unemployment. Among non recipients, the hazard jumps to 16 percent in 
the third month from 5 percent in the previous month, it descends to 
about 4 per:cent in the two subsequent months, and becomes 21 percent 
in the sixth month. The pattern of the hazard is similar for benefit 
recipients., Thus, among middle-aged women with the other reference 
charactaristics (see note 21), moderate positive duration dependence 
is apparent. 
Interpretation of the results 
The impact of unemployment compensation found in this investigation is 
22 Inclusion of an interaction term between the benefit assistance 
dummy and log of duration allowed for more variation in the hazard of 
assistance recipients but the coefficient was measured with high error. 
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somewhat surprinsily high. This result has to be assessed against the 
background of two contrasting facts. On the one hand, that the Spanish 
unemployment compensation system was reformed in 1992 to make it more 
stringent. And, on the orther hand, that the workers in the sample 
analyzed in this article experienced unemployment in 1993, year in 
which the Spanish economy went through a deep recession. Although one 
is tempted to interprete this finding as strong evidence of a negative 
effect of unemployment compensation on the re-employment probability 
in Spain, some qualifications are in order. When the economy is 
destroying employment at high speed, as was the case in the period 
1992-93,23 job opportunities are drasticaly reduced. Unless the 
reservation wage falls consequently, unemployment duration tends to 
increase in recessions. 
In the framework of the standard job search model with liquidity 
constrainsts (Mortensen (1986, pp. 859-61)), receipt of unemployment 
compensation can have a bigger negative impact on the re-employment 
probabili ty in sluguish labor markets. Workers not elegible for 
unemployment compensation are likely to suffer more severe liquidity 
constraints in recessions because alternative sources of income, like 
that from work of other members of the family, are negatively affected. 
In addition, the high proportion of temporary employment in Spain 
can have some relevant implications in a period of labor shedding. As 
many laid-off workers, particularly those with more atractive 
contracts, may expect to be recalled by the same firm after the 
recession, they are likely to remain on unemployment compensation for 
long time. By contrast, workers in less promissing, short-term jobs 
23 According to the labor force survey (EPA), in about two years, 
the level 
employment 
unemployment 
of 
r
employment declined by 
atio diminished by 3 
rate increased by 7 perc
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have higher motivation to search while employed. At the same time, they 
benefit from les s job competition by benefit recipients (reference ... ) . 
In general, search on the job is likely to be more frequent among 
workers who can anticipate their employment termination and are not 
entitled to receive unemployment compensation. Because these workers 
hold fixed-term contracts, they presumably receive lower wages than 
similar workers in more stable jobs, due to accumulation of human 
capital. Apart from increasing the movements from job to job without 
involving unemployment, search on the job can shorten the unemployment 
spell. It is reasonable to presume that workers who have not built 
enough employment tenure to be eligible for unemployment compensation, 
and know the almost certain end of their employment relationship, make 
greater effort to find another job while still employed. Even if search 
on the job does not provide an acceptable offer that prevents 
unemployment, it will improve employment prospects simply because it 
is a way of tapping future job opportunities. 24 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to add new evidence to the 
relationship between unemployment compensation and the re-employment 
probability. We used a sample of Spanish newly-unemployed workers and 
followed their unemployment spells for a maximum period of 9 months. 
This data set permitted us to study transitions out of unemployment by 
using a di.screte-time duration modelo To estimate the effect of 
unemployment benefits on the probability of leaving unemployment we 
used three al ternative measures for unemployment compensation receipt. 
24 The earlier the worker start search the more he can learn about 
the job market. This, in turn, can reduce the reservation wage and 
increase the exit from unemployment (Burdett and Wishwanath (1988)). 
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Three main results of this article are the following: (1) All 
measures for benefit receipt show a negative effect on exits from 
unemployment. The effect is strong, because the hazard for workers who 
do not receive benefits is double or higher than that for benefit 
recipients. (2) The predicted hazard exhibits moderate positive 
duration dependence for the whole sample. When men and women samples 
are separated, the reference man obtains a over-time flat hazard, and 
the reference wornen a hazard that increases with time unemployed. (3) 
The inclusion of variables related to the worker' s recent unemployment 
history, intended to pick up job turnover, do not affect the rnain 
results of t:his article. Although, for the reasons given aboye, we do 
not use those indicators in the main rnodel specification, we emphasize 
this result because labor turnover is particularly relevant in the 
Spanish institutional contexto 
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Table 1. Unemployrnent Survival Rates According to Receipt of Unemployrnent 
Compensation at the First Month of the Unemployrnent Spell 
Unemployrnent Al! Receive U. Receive U. Non 
duration in 
months 
Unemployed Insurance Assistance Recipients 
---------­ ----------­ ----------­ -----------­ ----------­
1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2 .904 .933 .981 .812 
3 .828 .838 .943 .737 
4 .749 .774 .924 .612 
5 .715 .752 .887 .562 
6 .648 .714 .773 .487 
7 .582 .667 .679 .412 
8 .540 .638 .679 .325 
9 .481 .600 .585 .250 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European 
Union, 1994. 
Table 2. Employment Transitions According to Receipt of Unemployment 
Compensation at Each Monthly Spell 
All Receive U. Receive U. Non 
Month 1 Unemployed Insurance Assistance Recipients 
At risk 239 105 53 81 
Exit 23 7 1 15 
Hazard rate 9.6 6.7 1.9 18.5 
Month 2 
At risk 216 95[+3] 51 [+1] 70=66+3+1 
Exit 18 9 2 7 
Hazard rate 8.3 9.5 3.9 10.0 
Month 3 
At risk 198 82 [+4] 50 [-J.] 66=63+4-1 
Exit 
Hazard rate 
17 (2) 
, 8.6 
5 (1) 
6.1 
1 
2.0 
11 (1) 
16.7 
Month 4 
At risk 179 73 [+3] 49[+2-2] 57=54+3+2-2 
Exit 7(1) 2 2 3 (1) 
Hazard rate 3.9 2.7 4.1 5.3 
Month 5 
At risk 171 65[+6] 50 [-3] 56=53+6-3 
Exit 15 (1) 2 6 7(1) 
Hazard rate 8.8 3.1 12.0 12.5 
Month 6 
At risk 155 63 44 48 
Exit 16 4 4 8 
Hazard rate 10.3 6.3 9.1 17.7 
Month 7 
At risk 139 57 [+2] 35 [+5] 47=40+2+5 
Exit 9(1) 3 O 6(1) 
Hazard rate 6.5 5.3 0.0 12.8 
Month 8 
At risk 129 54 34 [+1] 41=40+1 
Exit 14 4 4 6 
Hazard rate 10.8 7.4 11.8 14.6 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logistic Hazard Model 
for Re-employment Probabilities. Men and Women 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Women -.5930 2.45 -.5941 2.46 -.6385 2.67 
Married .0677 0.26 .0663 0.26 .0460 0.18 
Age 16-29 -.1527 0.35 -.1579 0.36 -.0882 0.20 
Age 30-44 
Age 45-64 
A16-29*log dur 
A45-65*log dur 
Children < 3 
-.8698 
-.2368 
.3667 
.4974 
1.33 
0.78 
0.86 
1.80 
-.8735 
-.2362 
.3680 
.5002 
1. 33 
0.78 
0.86 
1.81 
-.7947 
-.2548 
.3347 
.4520 
1.22 
0.84 
0.79 
1.63 
University 
Upper secondary 
Lower secondary 
.0601 
.6932 
.3190 
0.14 
1.46 
1.29 
.0628 
.6987 
.3185 
0.14 
1.46 
1.28 
-.0570 
.5419 
.2282 
0.13 
1.14 
0.92 
Primary 
Benefit receipt 
U. Insurance 
-1. 0499 4.88 
-1.0371 4.37 
U. Assistance -1. 0762 3.58 
Benefit amount -.0143 4.35 
First unemploy. 
Sample 1 
Sample 2 
.0103 
.3140 
-.0451 
0.03 
1. 00 
0.17 
.0096 
.3135 
-.0438 
0.03 
1.00 
0.16 
.0761 
.2899 
-.1213 
0.2-8 
0.92 
0.46 
Sample 
Sprint 
3 
.4738 0.92 .4748 0.92 .4644 0.91 
Summer 
Autonne .4009 0.77 .4021 0.77 .3875 0.74 
Month 1 
Month 2 
Month 3 
-.0392 
.2335 
0.11 
0.54 
-.0392 
.2341 
0.11 
0.54 
-.0391 
.2343 
0.11 
0.54 
Month 4 
Month 5 
Month 6 
Month 7 
Month 8 
Reg. un. 
Constant 
rate 
-.4526 
.5770 
.6274 
-.0523 
.4679 
-.0169 
-1.6746 
0.73 
0.85 
0.81 
0.05 
0.49 
0.95 
2.32 
-.4510 
.5793 
.6284 
-.0526 
.4673 
-.0162 
-1.6909 
0.72 
0.85 
0.82 
0.05 
0.49 
0.87 
2.31 
-.4636 
.5615 
.6272 
-.0251 
.4899 
-.0338 
-1. 2887 
0.75 
0.82 
0.82 
0.02 
0.52 
1. 89 
1. 77 
Number of monthly spells 1426 
Log likelihood -378.74 -378.73 -380.36 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logistic Hazard Model 
for Re-employment Probabilities. Men 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Married .0248 0.08 .0224 0.07 
-.0010 0.00 
Age 16-29 -.7535 1.51 -.8045 1.59 -.5647 1.14 
Age 30-44 
Age 45-64 -1.0971 1.50 -1.1285 1.53 -1. 0059 1.37 
A16-29*log dur .0523 0.14 .0625 0.17 .0204 0.05 
A45-65*log dur .5670 1.15 .5737 1.16 .5637 1.14 
Children < 3 .7842 2.57 .8098 2.64 .7607 2.50 
University .1921 0.34 .2528 0.44 .0003 0.00 
Upper secondary 1.1376 1. 84 1. 2276 1.96 .7919 1.29 
Lower secondary .5978 2.06 .5982 2.07 .4698 1.65 
Primary 
Benefit receipt -1.2341 4.68 
U. insurance -1.1560 4.08 
U. assistance -1. 4306 3.67 
Benefit amount 
-.0146 3.85 
First unemploy. .2391 0.72 .2439 0.73 .2548 0.76 
Sample 1 .0142 0.03 .0095 0.02 .0519 0.13 
Sample 2 .1352 0.43 .1405 0.45 .0335 0.10 
Sample 3 
Sprint .5849 0.95 .5960 0.96 .5758 0.94 
Summer 
Autonne -.3854 0.54 -.3789 0.53 -.4248 0.60 
Month 1 
Month 2 - .1175 0.29 - .1164 0.29 -.1312 0.33 
Month 3 - .1482 0.29 -.1403 0.27 -.1626 0.32 
Month 4 -.5113 0.72 -.4944 0.70 -.5456 0.78 
Month 5 .6930 0.87 .7182 0.90 .6461 0.81 
Month 6 .2811 0.30 .2988 0.32 .2505 0.27 
Month 7 .1013 0.09 .1102 0.10 .1111 0.10 
Month 8 .9047 0.77 .9106 0.77 .9112 0.77 
Reg. un. rate .0006 0.03 .0058 0.26 -.0168 0.81 
Constant -1.9227 2.24 -2.0518 2.34 -1. 6141 1. 87 
Number of monthly spells 885 
Log likelihood -258.21 -257.96 -261. 25 
Source: First: wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logistic Hazard Model 
for Re-employment Probabilities. Women 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Married 
Age 16-29 
Age 30-44 
.1137 
2.1998 
0.21 
1.75 
.1170 
2.2063 
0.22 
1. 75 
.0780 
2.1429 
0.14 
1. 70 
Age 45-64 
A16-29*log dur 
.5462 
-1. 6070 
0.31 
2.07 
.5321 
-1. 6057 
0.31 
2.06 
.4708 
-1.5838 
0.27 
2.03 
A45-65*log dur 
Children < 3 
-.6660 
-1.1781 
0.63 
1.33 
-.6605 
-1.1651 
0.63 
1.31 
-.6686 
-1.1082 
0.64 
1.23 
University -.4935 0.66 -.4468 0.57 -.4225 0.55 
Upper secondary .2993 0.31 .3136 0.32 .2531 0.25 
Lower secondary .1140 0.18 .1137 0.18 .0469 0.07 
Primary 
Benefit receipt - .8892 1. 78 
U. insurance 
-.9517 1.58 
U. assistance 
-.8276 1.39 
Benefit amount 
-.0163 1. 73 
First unemploy. -.4424 0.89 -.4485 0.90 -.3908 0.79 
Sample 1 1.4164 1.96 1.4464 1.96 1. 3795 1. 92 
Sample 2 -.0807 0.13 -.0864 0.14 - .1135 0.18 
Sample 3 
Sprint .2269 0.23 .2280 0.23 .2313 0.23 
Summer 
Autonne 1. 5034 1.64 1. 4938 1.63 1.4874 1.62 
Month 1 
Month 2 1.0343 1.00 1. 0390 1.01 1. 0448 1. 01 
Month 3 2.3364 1. 94 2.3379 1.94 2.3409 1. 93 
Month 4 .7719 0.46 .7738 0.46 .7717 0.45 
Month 5 .9846 0.52 .9847 0.52 .9801 0.52 
Month 6 2.6987 1.51 2.7045 1.51 2.7062 1.50 
Month 7 1.6275 0.82 1. 6398 0.82 1.6595 0.83 
Month 8 1.9516 0.94 1.9621 0.95 1. 9709 0.95 
Reg. un. rate -.0861 2.19 -.0877 2.17 -.1007 2.49 
Constant -2.2401 1. 23 -2.2077 1.21 -1. 8584 1.01 
Number of monthly spells 541 
Log likelihood -100.85 -100.83 -100.42 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table 6. Predicted Hazard Rates 
Men & Non 
Women recipients 
Month 1 12.13 
Month 2 11.71 
Month 3 14.84 
Month 4 8.07 
Month 5 19.73 
Month 6 20.54 
Month 7 11.58 
Month 8 18.06 
Non 
Men recipients 
Month 1 13.19 
Month 2 11.90 
Month 3 11.59 
Month 4 8.35 
Month 5 23.31 
Month 6 16.76 
Month 7 14.40 
Month 8 27.31 
Non 
Women reci.pients 
Month 1 1. 75 
Month 2 4.79 
Month 3 15.63 
Month 4 3.73 
Month 5 4.57 
Month 6 21. 02 
Month 7 8.35 
Month 8 11.19 
Note: Predicted hazard 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
Benefit 
receipt 
4.60 
4.43 
5.75 
2.98 
7.92 
8.29 
4.38 
7.16 
Benefit 
receipt 
4.23 
3.78 
3.67 
2.58 
8.13 
5.53 
4.66 
9.85 
Benefit 
receipt 
0.73 
2.02 
7.07 
1.56 
1.93 
9.86 
3.61 
4.92 
rates are 
Benefit 
amount 
5.55 
5.35 
6.91 
3.56 
9.34 
9.91 
5.42 
8.75 
Benefit 
amount 
5.45 
4.81 
4.67 
3.23 
9.91 
6.90 
6.05 
12.54 
Benefit 
amount 
0.69 
1.95 
6.79 
1.49 
1.83 
9.50 
3.55 
4.79 
based on 
u. u. 
insurance assistance 
4.65 4.48 
4.48 4.32 
5.81 5.60 
3.01 2.90 
8.01 7.73 
8.38 8.09 
4.42 4.26 
7.23 6.97 
u. u. 
insurance assistance 
4.49 3.45 
4.02 3.08 
3.93 3.01 
2.79 2.13 
8.80 6.83 
5.97 4.60 
4.99 3.84 
10.48 8.16 
u. u. 
insurance assistance 
0.68 0.77 
1.91 2.16 
6.69 7.51 
1.47 1.67 
1. 81 2.05 
9.37 0.48 
3.44 3.88 
4.69 5.28 
results presented in 
Appendix 1 
Table Al. Duration of Unemployment Compensation in Spain (since April 1992) 
in Months 
Period of 
contribution Insurance Assistance for unemployed with dependants 
Younger than 45 45 and older 
0-2 
3 3 3 
4 4 4 
5 5 5 
6-11 21 21 
12-17 18 24 
2 x integer{period of 
18-72 contribution / 6} 24 30 
Notes: 
1. Workers aged 45 years or older, without dependents, who received 
contributory benefits for 12 months or longer are eligible for 6 months of 
assistance benefits. Since April 1992, workers without dependents who made 
social security contributions for 6-11 months are eligible for 6 months of 
assistance benefits. 
2. All workers aged 45 years or older who received contributory benefits for 
24 months qualify for an special period of 6 months of assistance. 
3. Workers aged 52 years or older are eligible for benefits until retirement. 
4. Workers who returned from foreing migration, were relieved from prisson, 
or were declared able to work after an invalidity spell, are elegible for 18 
months of assistance. 
5. The amount of assistance benefits is 75 % of the m1n1mum wage. Since 1989, 
the benefit amount varies with the number of dependents for workers aged 45 
or older only if they had received contributory benefits for 24 months: 75 % 
of the minimum wage (one or no dependents), 100 % (two dependents), and 125 
% (three or more dependents) . 
Table A2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logistic Hazard Model 
for Re-employment Probabilities. Men and Women 
(Inclusion of indicator for job turnover) 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Women -.7345 2.94 -.7634 3.03 -.7527 3.04 
Married .0373 0.14 .0264 0.10 -.0236 0.09 
Age 16-29 -.0730 0.17 -.1393 0.32 -.0166 0.03 
Age 30-44 
Age 45-64 -.7107 1. 07 -.7681 1.14 -.6660 1.01 
A16-29*log dur -.3351 1.08 -.3426 1.10 -.3316 1. 07 
A45-65*log dur .2703 0.62 .2830 0.65 .2615 0.61 
Children < 3 .5407 1.91 .5753 2.04 .5041 1. 78 
University .2752 0.64 .3504 0.81 .0671 0.15 
Upper secondary .5359 1.06 .6080 1.21 .3714 0.74 
Lower secondary .3077 1.21 .2835 1.11 .2078 0.82 
Primary 
Benefit receipt -1.0927 4.93 
U. insurance -.9046 3.70 
U. assistance -1. 4426 4.56 
Benefit amount -.0133 3.83 
First unemploy. -.0899 0.32 - .1109 0.40 -.0014 0.00 
Job turnover=O 2.0495 2.96 2.2987 3.20 1.8225 2.67 
Job turnover=l 
Job turnover=2 -.0292 0.08 .0206 0.05 -.1083 0.29 
Job turnover=3 .6539 1. 75 .7809 2.06 .5114 1.37 
Job turnover=4 .3705 0.87 .3915 0.93 .3258 0.76 
Job turnover=5 .7437 2.20 .8367 2.45 .5636 1. 65 
Job turnover>=6 1. 2460 3.37 1.4290 3.69 1. 0167 2.74 
Sample 1 .3832 1.19 .3645 1.13 .3785 1.18 
Sample 2 -.0865 0.32 -.0914 0.33 - .1119 0.41 
Sample 3 
Sprint .4622 0.89 .4744 0.91 .4585 0.89 
Summer 
Autonne .3742 0.71 .3794 0.72 .3618 0.69 
Month 1 
Month 2 .0281 0.07 .0407 0.11 .0155 0.04 
Month 3 .3285 0.74 .3572 0.81 .3078 0.70 
Month 4 -.3349 0.53 -.2878 0.45 -.3701 0.59 
Month 5 .7402 1. 07 .8035 1.16 .6896 1.00 
Month 6 .8471 1. 08 .9044 1.15 .8001 1. 03 
Month 7 .2092 0.23 .2534 0.27 .1936 0.21 
Month 8 .7565 0.79 .8019 0.83 .7260 0.76 
Reg. un. rate -.0260 1.36 -.0182 0.93 -.0415 2.17 
Constant -1. 9626 2.60 -2.2178 2.89 -1. 5415 2.02 
Number of monthly spells 1426 
Log likelihood -367.56 -366.19 -371.94 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table A3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Logistic Hazard Model 
for Re-employrnent Probabilities. Men and Women 
(Inclusion of indicator for job turnover) 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Women 
Married 
Age 16-29 
-.6878 
-.0185 
-.2634 
2.73 
0.06 
0.58 
-.6911 
-.0322 
-.3103 
2.73 
0.11 
0.68 
-.7138 
-.0400 
-.2078 
2.86 
0.14 
0.46 
Age 30-44 
Age 45-64 -.8723 1.31 -.8931 1.34 -.8172 1.23 
A16-29*log dur -.2304 0.73 -.2328 0.73 
-.2208 0.70 
A45-65*log dur .2419 0.55 .2446 0.56 .2282 0.53 
Children < 3 .3906 1.34 .4124 1.42 .3430 1.18 
University -.0248 0.05 .0259 0.05 -.2374 0.53 
Upper secondary .3972 0.77 .4669 0.90 .2379 0.46 
Lower secondary .3083 1.17 .3090 1.17 .2226 0.85 
Primary 
Benefit receipt -.8563 3.79 
U. insurance -.7704 3.12 
U. assistance -1.0369 3.22 
Benefit amount 
-.0102 2.94 
First unemploy. .3259 1.15 .3196 1.13 .4002 1.43 
Once long-term -1.9072 6.99 -1.9241 7.02 -1. 8902 6.90 
Sample 1 .3078 0.93 .2963 0.89 .3177 0.96 
Sample 2 - .1162 0.43 - .1138 0.42 - .1715 0.64 
Sample 3 
Sprint .4586 0.87 .4620 0.88 .4609 0.88 
Summer 
Autonne .4428 0.82 .4491 0.83 .4099 0.76 
Month 1 
Month 2 .0339 0.09 .0395 0.10 .0178 0.04 
Month 3 .3801 0.84 .3919 0.87 .3654 0.81 
Month 4 -.2977 0.46 -.2786 0.43 -.3256 0.51 
Month 5 .8461 1. 20 .8687 1.23 .8200 1.17 
Month 6 .9464 1.19 .9611 1.20 .9368 1.18 
Month 7 .3125 0.33 .3161 0.34 .3433 0.37 
Month 8 .9825 1. 00 .9895 1.01 .9911 1.02 
Reg. un. rate -.0491 2.65 -.0446 2.32 -.0644 3.48 
Constant -.4007 0.52 -.4925 0.64 -.1078 0.14 
Number of monthly spells 1426 
Log likelihood -346.82 -346.49 -349.49 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
Table A4. Sample Means and Proportions 
Individuals observations Monthly spells 
Al! Men Women Al! Men Women 
Re-employment: .0962 .1257 .0375 .0834 .0983 .0591 
Women .3347 .3793 
Married .6234 .5911 .6875 .6535 .6203 .7079 
Age 16-29 .4058 .4088 .4000 .3842 .3864 .3807 
Age 30-44 .3765 .3584 .4125 .3688 .3367 .4214 
Age 45-64 .2175 .2327 .1875 .2468 .2768 .1977 
Children < 3 .1422 .1509 .1250 .1157 .1039 .1349 
University .0753 .0566 .1125 .0806 .0610 .1127 
Upper secondary .0460 .0377 .0625 .0350 .0259 .0499 
Lower secondary .2552 .2955 .1750 .2335 .2689 .1756 
Primary .6234 .6100 .6500 .6507 .6440 .6617 
Benefit receipt .6610 .6540 .6750 .6746 .6915 .6469 
U. insurance .4393 .4716 .3750 .4165 .4621 .3419 
U. assistance .2217 .1823 .3000 .2580 .2293 .3049 
Benefit amount 40.0851 43.3268 33.6421 39.5903 44.6931 31.2430 
First unemploy. .2301 .1698 .3500 .2201 .1468 .3401 
Job turnover=O .0167 .0125 .0250 .0112 .0045 .0221 
Job turnover=l .1715 .1886 .1375 .1802 .2169 .1201 
Job turnover==2 .1966 .2201 .1500 .2117 .2451 .1571 
Job turnover==3 .1380 .1509 .1125 .1297 .1378 .1164 
Job turnover==4 .0753 .0880 .0500 .0736 .0892 .0480 
Job turnover==5 .2259 .1509 .3750 .2531 .1570 .4103 
Job turnover:>=6 .1338 .1383 .1250 .0981 .0994 .0961 
Once long-term .4016 .4150 .3750 .4810 .5186 .4195 
Sample 1 .1841 .2012 .1500 .1704 .2000 .1219 
Sample 2 .3723 .3522 .4125 .3842 .3548 .4325 
Sample 3 .4518 .4528 .4500 .4467 .4463 .4473 
Sprint .4186 .4418 .3807 
Summer .3583 .3502 .3715 
Autonne .2230 .2079 .2476 
Month 1 .1676 .1796 .1478 
Month 2 .1514 .1570 .1423 
Month 3 .1388 .1401 .1367 
Month 4 .1255 .1254 .1256 
Month 5 .1199 .1175 .1238 
Month 6 .1086 .1005 .1219 
Month 7 .0974 .0926 .1053 
Month 8 .0904 .0870 .0961 
Reg. un. rate 25.4313 24.5769 27.1294 25.9723 24.8805 27.7584 
Source: First wave of the Household Panel of the European Union, 1994. 
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Figure 1. Unemployment Survival Rates for the Whole Sample and by Unemployment 
Compensation Status at the Start of Unemployment 
